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1 Introduction.
Higher education can be viewed both as a consumption good for which the individual
is willing to pay, and as an investment alternative that yields higher wages later
in life. The factors determining the individual’s educational choice can be divided
into three groups: preferences, returns, and costs. The costs of attending higher
education are eﬀort, time andmoney, both direct monetary outlays and forgone labor
income1. The return to higher education comes both as pecuniary and non-pecuniary
returns. As higher education increases the skill level, and thus also the productivity
of the individual, he is paid a higher wage in the labor market. Also, higher skilled
individuals qualify for diﬀerent types of jobs than lower skilled individuals. High-
skilled jobs often oﬀer various fringe benefits, which are not paid as money, but
which are all equivalent to a wage increase. Fringe benefits2 and the wage premium
constitute the pecuniary return to higher education. The individual specific non-
pecuniary return to higher education is the intrinsic or the consumption value of
education, which is defined in section 3.
This paper suggests a method for measuring the consumption value of education
in a compensating diﬀerentials framework when the ability bias is corrected for. The
identification strategy is to compare two individuals who attended teacher’s college
and business school respectively in Norway during the 1960’s. In this period these
two types of education required the same minimum average grade level from high
school for admittance, but they generated very diﬀerent wage returns. The wage
return from attending business school in this period is used as a benchmark for
the potential wage return of the teacher’s college graduates. Using the Norwegian
1970 census, cross section wage profiles are estimated for those business school and
teacher’s college graduates with diﬀerent levels of working experience. These wage
profiles are interpreted as the expected future wages of the individuals attending
business school and teacher’s college during the 1960’s. The ex-ante price of the
consumption value of teacher’s college is estimated to be 38 % of the present value
of the individual’s potential lifetime income. Using unique Norwegian panel data the
actual wage profiles for the individuals acquiring their education during the 1960’s
are estimated. The ex-post price of this consumption value of teacher’s college turned
1Costs are disregarded in the following analysis.
2Fringe benefits are here defined to be benefits with a clear monetary equivalent, such as a
company car, free newspaper subscriptions, and a company health insurance.
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out to be about 46 % of the present value of their potential lifetime income.
The goal of the paper is not to find the exact value of the willingness to pay
for the consumption value of education, but rather to establish as a fact that the
consumption value of education does exist and that it is an important factor behind
the individual’s educational choice. As shown by the example, many individuals are
willing to give up substantial future wage returns in order to acquire the educational
type of their choice. Therefore, the consumption value of education should not be
ignored when modeling the individual’s educational choice and estimating the return
to education.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an historical overview of the
debate on the return to education, and section 3 discusses and defines the concept
of consumption value of education. The estimation of the monetary value of the
consumption value of teacher’s college relative to business school is conducted in
section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Higher education: Investment or consumption?
Prior to the human capital revolution in the 1960’s, education was considered to be
a consumption good. One shortcoming of this framework was that it ignored the
fact that pursuing education actually increases the productivity of the individual
and his wages in the next period. Schultz3 (1960) and Becker (1964) introduced
the theory of human capital, where education is an investment that increases the
individual’s wage in the next period. The individual acquires education until the
present value of the expected marginal wage return equals the marginal return of
other investment alternatives. The cost of the investment is the sum of the direct
costs, such as tuition fees, books and other expenses, and forgone labor income. This
theory was highly controversial at the time, since education was considered to be a
cultural good. Schultz (1960) stated that ”it is held by many to be degrading to man
and morally wrong to look upon his education as a way of creating capital. ...For them
education is basically cultural and not economic in its purpose, because education serves
to develop individuals to become responsible citizens. ...My reply to those who believe
3”I propose to treat education as an investment in man and to treat its consequences as a form
of capital. Since education becomes a part of the person receiving it, I shall refer to it as human
capital.” Shultz (1960).
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thus is that an analysis that treats education as one of the activities that may add to
the stock of human capital in no way denies the validity of their position... Some kind of
education may improve the capabilities of a people as they work and manage their aﬀairs,
and these improvements may increase the national income.”
Mincer (1974)4 developed the framework which is still the most frequently used in
the empirical estimation of the wage return to education. A simplifying assumption
in this model is that the wage return to job experience and the wage return to
education can be estimated separately. In his model, the log of the individual’s
earnings, Y, in a period can be decomposed into an additive function of a linear
education term and a quadric experience term:
lnY = β1 + β2E + β3X + β4X2 + ², (1)
where E is the length of the completed education in years, X represents the num-
ber of years of work experience5 after leaving school, and ² is the residual. The
parameter β2 is then the rate of return to an additional year of education. This
marginal return to education is assumed to be independent of both type and level of
education. β3 represents the return to experience, which is expected to be concave,
and β4 estimates the extent of this concavity. But there are problems with this ap-
proach. It assumes that education increases the individual’s wage, but it could also
be that this is a result of individuals with high innate income potential choosing to
acquire higher education, such that there is an ability bias in the sample. Also, the
relationship between occupational choice, earnings, and job attributes is simultane-
ously determined; the reward structure determines the educational choice, and the
educational choice determines the reward structure. Thus the amount of schooling
included in the wage equation is not exogenous, and a simultaneity problem exists.
Another problem is that there is heterogeneity in the wage return to human capital
investments. Willis and Rosen (1979) claim that this induces the individual to choose
the type of education for which he has a comparative advantage given his innate
abilities. The analysis in this paper concentrates on solving the selection problem.
Increasingly sophisticated econometric methods have been developed to correct
for the above described estimation problems, and this has been the focal point in
4See Chiswick (2003) for a retrospective discussion of the importance of Mincer’s contribution.
5In the absence of direct information on work experience Mincer suggested to use ”potential
experience”, which is the individual’s age minus his school starting age minus years in school.
4
the empirical literature over the last twenty years.6 The existence of other motives
for the individual’s educational choice besides higher future wages has been more
or less ignored. Instead of analyzing what motivates the individual’s educational
choice, the eﬀort has been concentrated on analyzing the most easily measurable
outcome of this choice, namely the eﬀect on wages.
But economics is the theory of choice, and it deals with the satisfaction of human
desires through choice of actions. Human desires are satisfied by human interaction
and through economic activity, which is the exchange of goods and services. Plato
defined three types of desires; desire for wisdom and knowledge, for honor, fame,
and power, and the appetitive desires, which are usually satisfied through spending
money. The satisfaction of these desires is motivated and accompanied by pleasure,
which is necessary up to a point and harmful when pursued in excess. Marshall
distinguished between wants and activities. Wants are satisfied by consumption of
services and goods, while activities either contribute to the production of goods and
services or are pleasurable in themselves.
Adam Smith was the first to formulate the idea of monetary and non-monetary
compensations of a job, an idea later formalized in the compensating diﬀerentials
literature: ”The five following are the principal circumstances which, so far as I have been
able to observe, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some employments, and counterbal-
ance a great one in others: first, the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments
themselves; secondly, the easiness and cheapness, or the diﬃculty and expense of learning
them; thirdly, the constancy or inconstancy of employment in them; fourthly, the small or
great trust which must be reposed in those who exercise them; and fifthly, the probability
or improbability of success in them. ...Honour makes a great part of the reward of all
honorable professions. In point of pecuniary gain, all things considered, they are generally
under-recompensed. ...Disgrace has the contrary eﬀect.”7 Later Marshall (1920) stated
that ”the true reward which an occupation oﬀers the labourer has to be calculated by
deducting the money value of all disadvantages from that of all its advantages”.
The fact that activities can be pleasurable in themselves and help satisfy certain
desires has for a long time been widely ignored in the economic literature. There
are a few exceptions, though. Lazaer (1977) finds in his sample of US males that
lower levels of higher education are considered a consumption bad by the individual,
6See Card (1999) for an extensive literature overview of this field.
7The Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Ch. 10, Part1.
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while MA’s and PhD’s are considered to be consumption goods8. Oosterbeek and
van Ophem (2000) allow the individual to have immediate utility from schooling,
and they maximize lifetime utility instead of the usual lifetime income approach.
They find that the young Dutch individuals in their sample invest too much in edu-
cation compared with what is optimal from the human capital theory, and they con-
clude that the consumption motives with regard to schooling are indeed important9.
Kodde and Ritzen (1984) combine the human capital model and the consumption
model and find that the individual demands more education than in the pure hu-
man capital model. This is due to the direct utility gain he experiences through the
consumption of education. Oosterbeek and Webbink (1995) find that the integrated
model where education is both an investment alternative and a consumption good is
the best to explain the educational choices of the young individuals, and that both
the consumption motive and the investment motive matter. The shortcomings of
the pure human capital model in explaining the individuals’ educational choices are
also pointed out by Oreopoulos (2003).
More work has been done on identifying diﬀerent non-pecuniary returns to a
particular job, such as pleasant working conditions or status. Examples are Antos
and Rosen (1975), Ward and Sloane (2000), and Scott (2001), who all apply the
compensating diﬀerentials framework described in Rosen (1986).
Stern (1999) considers a sample of postdoctoral biologists who decide where to
start working, and who are oﬀered jobs with diﬀerent job characteristics. The result
suggests a strong negative relationship between wages and the opportunity to engage
in scientific activity; the biologists have to pay, in forgone wages, to be able to do
scientific work. Firms who allow their employees to publish papers based on their
results from the job pay on average 25% lower wages than the firms who do not allow
their employees to engage in academic activity. This line of reason is also followed
by Klette and Møen (2002), who state that academics pay a considerable price for
their academic joy, measured in forgone labor income by not working in the private
sector.
The literature also mostly ignores that diﬀerent types of education generate dif-
8Gullason (1989) also finds a positive ”consumption value” to schooling for US males, where
most of this value consisted of avoiding being drafted for the Vietnam war as long as the person
was in school.
9This idea was already promoted by Schaafsma (1976).
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ferent rates of wage return. Education is assumed to be a homogenous good that
generates an annual rate of return. One exception is Keane and Wolpin (1997).
In a dynamic structural model they consider self-selection in three heterogenic di-
mensions: schooling, work, and occupational choice, and they find that most of the
variance in lifetime utility is explained by inequality in skill endowment. Aakvik et
al. (2003) also find on rich Norwegian panel data that the wage return to education
is heterogenous among individuals.
Although the existence of non-pecuniary returns to education is acknowledged in
the literature, they are seldom included in the formal analysis. The non-pecuniary
returns to education are mostly only mentioned anecdotally, and a proper definition
of the consumption value of education is to my knowledge missing in the literature.
The discussion below aims at correcting for this.
3 Non-pecuniary returns to higher education.
Acquiring higher education has many eﬀects; some serve as incentives for the in-
dividual at the time of the educational choice, whereas others are by-products of
the educational process. The non-pecuniary return to higher education can from
the individual’s point of view be divided into two groups; intended and unintended
non-pecuniary benefits. The consumption value of higher education is the intended
non-pecuniary returns to education; these are the factors the individual is aware of
at the time of the educational choice. But there are other non-pecuniary returns to
higher education, of which the individual may not be aware at the time of his educa-
tional choice. These are the unintended non-pecuniary returns to higher education.
3.1 The consumption value of higher education.
Substantial non-pecuniary advantages and returns to education exist, both during
the educational process and after its completion. Duncan (1976) defined the con-
sumption benefits of a job as the positive flow of satisfaction provided by the work
situation. This may be enjoyment, interest, challenge, and social relationships, which
are all subjective relations of individuals to the job situation. Higher education en-
ables the individual to choose from a broader specter of jobs that are mostly con-
sidered more interesting and more challenging (Weisbrod, 1962). Higher education
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makes the individual more flexible in the type of job he is able to perform, as well
as in where to perform it, which provides insurance against unemployment (Bishop,
1994). This flexibility varies between diﬀerent types of education, and individuals
who prefer to live in a particular area or who prefer the option of part-time work
will choose educational types that lead to jobs with these attributes.
Diﬀerent types of education diﬀer in how much eﬀort is required from the indi-
vidual to complete the education. The eﬀort level required in the jobs available after
completed education also varies. Low eﬀort input and thus much leisure are qualities
valued by many individuals. There is also a non-dismissable increase in social status
from completing a higher education. Dolton et al. (1989) find that among arts and
social science graduates it seems like occupational status plays an important role in
the educational choice.
The consumption value of education while acquiring it consists among other
things of the joy of learning new things, meeting new people, moving to a new city,
and participating in campus and student activities, in addition to the increased
status in the society that often comes from being a student of particular fields10.
Nerdrum (1999) discusses this in detail and states that ”some people choose to become
students mostly to be able to take part in such a way of life. Their aim is principally
directed towards immediate consumption, and they consider the other eﬀects, like positive
monetary returns, as pure positive by-products”.
I summarize all these non-pecuniary returns to education as the consumption
value of education.
Classification diﬃculties. Not all non-pecuniary returns to education are
straightforward to classify. For instance, Nerdrum (1999) states that memberships in
clubs and organizations during their time as a student provide the individuals with a
network of people spread over the world, both for professional and private purposes,
which often prove to be extremely valuable. If having this network provides the indi-
vidual with an intrinsic joy, it should be counted as a part of the consumption value
of education. But if this network furthers his career, it is a kind of investment during
the education that yields a future monetary return, and it should not be regarded
10Scitovsky (1976) states that as countries get richer and the individuals have more leisure,
they need satisfaction to avoid boredom. He also states that education is one such stimulus that
increases satisfaction both during and after the educational period if chosen correctly.
8
as a consumption value of education.
The fact that one educational type requires less eﬀort both during the educational
process as well as in the future jobs is above defined as a consumption value, since the
individual enjoys having more leisure. But one could also claim that this educational
type has lower investment costs, measured in eﬀort.
3.2 Unintended non-pecuniary returns to education.
When making his educational choice, the individual maximizes his ex-ante prefer-
ences, and thus the consumption value of education ought to be measured at this
point in time. The educational process might change his preferences, such that his
ex-post preferences diﬀer from his ex-ante preferences, along with his ex-post valua-
tion of the consumption value of education. These changes in preferences are ex-ante
unforeseen. They do not serve as a motivation behind the individual’s educational
choice, and should thus not be included in the ex-ante consumption value of educa-
tion. See Sandmo (1983) for a discussion of ex-ante vs. ex-post welfare evaluations.
Unintended individual returns. The human capital theory allows for the exis-
tence of consumption eﬀects of education, but they are only mentioned anecdotally
and consist of factors such as learning to appreciate opera and reading Goethe in
the original language11. These changes in preferences are unintended, since they are
results of influence on the individual during the time of his education. They are
not the result of a conscious choice, since he did not treasure these things at the
time of the educational choice. Individuals make their educational choice in order
to maximize their utility according to their ex-ante preferences. Thus this eﬀect is
not part of the consumption value of education as defined in this paper.
If interpreted within a framework similar to the ”Rational Addiction”12 approach
of Becker andMurphy (1988), or more generally the ”Extended Preference” approach
of Becker (1996), the conclusion is the opposite of the one above. These approaches
generalize the usual discounted utility model, by letting the instantaneous utility in
any given period be a function of past consumption experiences. In the intertemporal
optimization problem, the rational consumer takes into account that even if he
11See for instance Judd (2001) and Nerdrum (1999).
12See Wangen (2003) for a discussion of this.
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prefers rock music to classical music in the present period - according to today’s
instantaneous utility function - he foresees that the educational process changes his
future instantaneous utility functions in a way that will make him prefer classical
music.
Preferences: Shifts and history dependence. In most economic models indi-
viduals’ preferences are assumed to be exogenously given and constant over time,
when they are in fact influenced and shaped by the surroundings. New information,
learning, experience, innovation, and human interactions aﬀect the individual and
might induce a shift in his preferences over time. If the individuals were to make
their educational choices at the age of five, we would have nations of firemen! This
section discusses these preference shifts in more detail.
Croix (2001) claims that intergenerational spillover has taste externalities, as
when fear of insects or career aspirations are transmitted from parents to children.
Hægeland et al. (1999) find that parental educational level has a positive eﬀect on
the length of the education the children acquire. Preferences are also transmitted
through the habit formation eﬀect, which reflects the eﬀects of past decisions on the
perception of current outcomes. Diﬀerent aspects of the consumption value of higher
education can be subject to history dependence, as stated by Acemoglu (1995). New
generations learn from the older generations and to some extent inherit established
value judgements and attitudes. For instance, what is perceived to give social status
and prestige changes over time as the external factors such as political regime,
religion, and economics change13. This aﬀects who chooses the diﬀerent occupations
and thus also the distribution of talent in the society.
Bowles (1972) argues that ”there is considerable evidence that rich, high status
parents place a larger value on the non-pecuniary aspects of work and a lower value on
monetary returns than poorer, lower status parents”. Osterbeek and van Ophem (2000)
find support for this; the consumption motive for the educational choice seems to be
more important the higher the social background the individual has, and the better
13Acemoglu (1995) mentions as an example the fall and rise of the merchant’s status in the
Mediterranean area: ”The arrival of Islam in the Mediterranean in the eight century stopped
commerce through this sea to a large extent. This lead to the disappearance of merchants. In the
twelfth century, the Christian counterattack against Islam started and Europeans took once again
control of the Mediterranean. This gradually led to the renewed trade and to the activity organized
around towns and merchants.”
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skilled he is. They also find that children of highly educated fathers or fathers with
higher level occupations have lower discount rates than children of lower educated
fathers or fathers with lower level occupations. This means that a child from a poorer
family seems to attach lower weight to future earnings than children in richer families
do.
As individuals’ preferences might change over time, so might their discount rates.
Most individuals acquire higher education when they are young. One could claim
that young people in general have short time horizons and high discount rates when
making their choices. Thus they put more weight on the present consumption value
of education than on the future income possibilities when making their educational
choice. Later in life they might regret this and have a lower willingness to pay for
the consumption value of education (measured in forgone labor income). This type
of time inconsistency and hyperbolic discounting is discussed by Ainslie and Haslam
(1992). This problem is avoided in the following empirical analysis by applying the
individuals’ ex-ante preferences in the estimation of the price of the consumption
value of education and assuming a constant discount rate.
Social returns to education. The altered preference structures during the edu-
cational process have positive eﬀects on the welfare in the society if they induce the
individual to take better care of his health and to become a better citizen. Lochner
and Moretti (2001) find that education has a causal negative eﬀect on incarceration,
Lleras-Muney (2002) finds that education has a causal negative eﬀect on mortal-
ity, while Milligan et al. (2003) find that schooling improves civic participation in
political processes. Also, higher education has a positive eﬀect on economic growth
through technological innovation from increased knowledge spill-overs (Lucas, 1988,
and Romer, 1990). These are all reasons why many countries subsidize higher edu-
cation substantially.
3.3 Uncertainty.
As the individual makes his educational choice based on his expectations of the
returns to the investment, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, there is considerable
uncertainty present. It might very well be that he has incomplete information of the
content and thus also the consumption value of the education, or that his preferences
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change during the education process, as discussed above. Also, since there is a sub-
stantial lag from when the investment decision is made to when the pecuniary return
is generated, he needs to make this investment decision based on his expectations
of future wages, job openings, taxes etc. Due to poor information, business cycles,
politics, and his future health these expectations are uncertain and very much based
on the present situation in the society at the time when he makes his educational
choice. When making his educational choice, the individual has a full range of types
to choose from, but after the completion of the education he has limited options of
which careers to pursue, and this represents a potential lock-in eﬀect.
4 Amethod for measuring the consumption value
of higher education.
I apply the compensating diﬀerentials framework to measure the consumption value
of teacher’s college. The model is described below, along with the data and the ap-
proach to correct for the innate abilities of the individuals. The results are presented
and discussed in the last part of this section.
4.1 Compensating diﬀerentials.
Rosen (1986) states that the theory of compensating diﬀerentials ”refers to observed
wage diﬀerences required to equalize the total pecuniary and non-pecuniary advantages
or disadvantages among work activities and among workers themselves”. A modified
version of Rosen’s model will in the following be applied to measure one particular
individual’s valuation of the consumption value of type-A education when type-B
education is used as benchmark.
The individual maximizes his utility U , which depends positively on both ordi-
nary consumption C and the consumption value ei of education Ei :
U = u(C, ei), i = A,B.
ei is an index of the consumption value of type-i education; the higher the consump-
tion value, the higher the value of ei. The consumption value index is individual
specific, such that when one individual has higher consumption value of type-A edu-
cation, another individual may have higher consumption value of type-B education.
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Assume that all income is consumed, and that the individual only lives for one
period. He acquires education in the beginning of the period and works and consumes
in the end of the period. His consumption level thus equals his wage income, C = wi,
where the net of taxes wage level depends on the type of education chosen. The
individual’s utility function can be written as
U = u(wi, ei), i = A,B. (2)
Both variables are continuous, and fringe benefits are not considered. There are no
non-wage types of monetary income in the model. This is a one-period model, but wi
and ei can be viewed as the present values of lifetime income and consumption value
that the individual experiences by choosing type-i education. At the beginning of the
period the individual makes his educational choice, and he may choose between the
two educational types A and B, which diﬀer in both consumption value and wage
return. For this particular individual, type-A education has the higher consumption
value:
eA > eB. (3)
For a given wage return, w, to both kinds of education, the individual always prefers
type-A education, since it holds the higher consumption value to him:
u(w, eA) > u(w, eB).
The decision is more complicated if the wage return diﬀers between the two types
of education. Then the combination of individual preferences, wage return, and
consumption value of the educational type determines which is preferred. Let w∗B
be the wage return to type-B education that the individual requires in order to be
indiﬀerent between the two educational types when type-A education has the wage
return wA :
u(wA, eA) = u(w
∗
B, eB). (4)
Since type-B education is never preferred to type-A education if they have the same
wage return, it follows that
w∗B > wA. (5)
Now define the diﬀerence
D = w∗B − wA
as the individual compensating diﬀerential for type-A education compared with type-
B education. The individual compensating diﬀerential D is the additional wage
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return to type-B education necessary to make the individual indiﬀerent between the
two educational types at their given consumption values. Thus D is the wage return
that the individual is willing to forgo in order to enjoy the consumption value eA.
This willingness to pay for the consumption value of type-A is individual specific.
For now we only consider one individual, but when we expand the model to consider
a group of individuals,D will vary among the individuals choosing type-A education.
LetW be the market compensating wage diﬀerential, defined as the diﬀerence in
the market wage returns to type-B and type-A education.:
W = wB − wA. (6)
The market oﬀers the individual the additional wage return W if he chooses type-
B education and forgoes the consumption value he could have enjoyed by choosing
type-A education. If the individual compensating wage diﬀerential is the same as the
market compensating wage diﬀerential, D = W, then the individual is indiﬀerent
between the two types of education. If D < W, the market oﬀers a greater wage
compensation for choosing type-B education than is required by the individual. He
chooses type-B education and thus increases his consumption level by more than
what is required to compensate for the utility loss by not enjoying the consumption
value of type-A education. On the other hand, ifD > W, the individual chooses type-
A education, since the wage premium by choosing type-B education is less than what
is required to compensate for the utility loss he experiences by not choosing type-A
education.
Now consider figure 1, where an example of one particular preference structure is
displayed. Type-A education oﬀers the reward structure (eA, wA), point a, and type-
B education oﬀers the reward structure (eB, wB), point b. The individual requires
the wage w∗B in order to be indiﬀerent between the two kinds of education, and here
w∗B > wB. The individual compensating wage diﬀerential, D, is given by the vertical
distance between points c and a, while the market compensating wage diﬀerential,
W , is given by the vertical distance between the points b and a. Thus, at this
given preference structure and wage structure the individual is undercompensated
by the wage return to type-B education for forgoing the consumption value of type-A
education, D > W , and the individual chooses type-A education.
The market compensating wage diﬀerential, W, is the market price of the con-
sumption value of type-A education, and it is available to all individuals. Still,
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Figure 1: Individual and market wage diﬀerentials and the choice of educational type.
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individuals diﬀer in their preferences, and so does the individual compensating wage
diﬀerential, D. As an example, let the educational preferences of all individuals be
distributed over the individual taste variable D as illustrated in figure 2. Assume
that they all have the same level of innate abilities. The average value of the individ-
ual compensating wage diﬀerential is represented by E(D). As already discussed, the
individual’s preferences might change due to external influences. This would shift
the distribution of preferences and also the average value of the individual compen-
sating wage diﬀerential. The market oﬀers the compensation W to the individuals
who forgo the consumption value of type-A education and instead choose type-B ed-
ucation. In this specific case W < E(D), and the majority of the individuals choose
type-A education, since the forgone labour income by doing so is less than the price
they are willing to pay for the consumption value of type-A education, D. As W
increases, some individuals are no longer willing to forgo that high a wage return
in order to enjoy type-A education, and more individuals choose type-B education.
The individuals who choose type-B education have the lowest preferences for the
consumption value of type-A education. Since individuals diﬀer in taste, their reser-
vation wage return,D, also diﬀers. This ensures the existence of economic rent in the
labour market. Most individuals who choose type-B education receive an economic
rent of the sizeW −D. The marginal individuals earn no economic rent, while most
individuals who choose type-A education also receive an economic rent, since their
willingness to pay for the consumption value of type-A education is higher than the
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Figure 2: Distribution of individual compensating wage diﬀerentials and the choice
of educational type.
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Individuals who 
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actual price demanded by the market in the form of the market compensating wage
diﬀerential. The conclusion from this is that the market compensating wage diﬀeren-
tial W serves as a lower bound on the willingness to pay for the consumption value
of type-A education among the individuals choosing it.
Income taxes. In the above model, the market compensating wage diﬀerential
W is defined in the absence of taxes. Intuitively, one would expect income taxes,
T, to reduce the net market compensating wage diﬀerential, Wn, available to the
individual:
Wn =W − T.
The consumption value of education is a tax free return to human capital invest-
ments. Progressive income taxes reduce the wage return to type-B education rela-
tively more than the wage return to type-A education, and this could reduce the net
market compensating wage diﬀerential. See Alstadsæter (2003) for a discussion of
how the tax system might induce the individuals to choose more of the educational
type with the higher consumption value.
But the above discussion implicitly assumes that the gross wage diﬀerential is
unaﬀected by taxes, which is usually not the case. As Persson and Sandmo (2002)
show in a special case, increased progressivity in the tax schedule might actually lead
to higher after tax wage inequality. To say anything about the eﬀects of diﬀerent
tax schedules on the net of taxes wage diﬀerentials requires a thorough discussion on
the wage determination mechanisms, but this goes beyond the scope of the paper.
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Selection problem. The market compensating wage diﬀerential might be mea-
sured by comparing two types of education with diﬀerent consumption values. If all
individuals had the same level of innate abilities, the diﬀerence in the wage return
to the two educational types would be the individual’s average minimum willingness
to pay for the consumption value of the more beneficial educational type. But dif-
ferent individuals have diﬀerent innate abilities, experiences, and personalities. The
wage return to the educational type is now partly endogenous, depending on innate
individual ability. The individuals also have diﬀerent views on which educational
type has the higher consumption value.
The selection problem can be accounted for by finding two individuals with the
same level of innate ability, but who have diﬀerent preferences and make diﬀer-
ent educational and career choices. One possible approach to this is the growing
identical-twin study literature (see Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998). This strand of lit-
erature utilizes surveys on identical twins, who are assumed to have the same level of
innate abilities. The wage return to one additional year of education is estimated by
using the earnings of the other twin as a benchmark for the given ability level. But
this method is controversial. Bound and Solon (1999) state that ”even monozygonic
twins are a little diﬀerent, and their (often small) diﬀerences in abilities and temper may
contribute to their (often small) diﬀerences in schooling.”
This paper proposes an alternative approach. The identification strategy is to
compare individuals with approximately the same grade level at high school grad-
uation, but who choose diﬀerent types of higher education. Grades are here used
as an instrument for ability. The individuals who attended teacher’s college (type-
A education) during the 1960’s could have attended business school (type-B) and
experienced a much higher wage return but chose the higher consumption value of
teacher’s college. Thus wage return to business school is the benchmark for their
potential future wage return14. The educational choice here also implicitly means
14This does not mean that business school has a low or negative consumption value for the
individuals actually choosing to attend business school. It might very well be that these individuals’
preferences are such that they have a high consumption value from attending business school.
Here we look at the issue from the point of view of the individuals who actually chose teachers’
college, even though they could have attended business school and increased their lifetime income
substantially (as is shown later in this paper). These individuals most certainly expected a positive
consumption value of education that was at least as large as the diﬀerence in the expected wage
returns to the two kinds of education.
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a choice of sector, since most teachers work in the public sector and a majority of
business school graduates work in the private sector.
4.2 The consumption value of teacher’s college.
Teaching used to be considered a noble profession, and as late as in the 1960’s
many considered teaching a calling15, and admission requirements were strict. It is
remarkable that teaching was such a popular profession, seeing that teachers had
modest salaries compared with many other jobs available to skilled individuals16.
One reason for this is that the gender wage discrimination was small among teachers,
and that it was a profession easier for women to combine with raising children.
Women go in and out of the labor force more frequently than men and, in addition,
few women attended business school in the 1960’s. Thus only males are considered
here.
The remaining explanation for the high popularity of teacher’s college is the
high consumption value of this educational type. Teacher’s college covers a broad
range of diﬀerent subjects, where the students themselves choose which to specialize
in, according to their interests. Also, this field of study is considered to be less
demanding and time consuming than many others, leaving more time for leisure
and extra curricular activities during the education17. After completed education,
teacher’s college graduates can expect to have more leisure, since teachers have
longer holidays. Teachers can get jobs all over the country, and are not bound to
live in the larger cities, as are many other of the highly educated individuals, and
this might play an important role for individuals planning to live in particular areas.
The individuals choosing teacher’s college have such a high consumption value of
this education that they willingly give up the future wage return they could have
achieved by choosing another type of education.
Business school is another field of study18 that requires a high grade level from
15The author’s own observations by reading arhived letters to the admission board.
16See Aarrestad (1969).
17This is here defined as a part of the consumptiton value, since the individual enjoys having a
more relaxed life and being able to pursue his other interests. But it might as well be defined as a
part of the investment costs, since it means that the teacher’s college student needs to invest less
eﬀort to graduate than his business school counterpart.
18Business school was attended directly after high school and had a duration of three years
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high school in order to be admitted. During the 1960’s the admission requirements
were just as strict for both these fields of study19, but the wage return to business
school was superior to that to teacher’s college, as pointed out by Aarrestad (1969,
1972). Even though the teacher’s college graduates could have attended business
school and had a higher wage return, they still chose to attend teacher’s college.
Hence they were willing to forgo future wages in order to enjoy the consumption
value of teacher’s college. Of course, they could have chosen other fields of study as
well, but business school is chosen as a benchmark because it has the same admission
requirements.
We now apply the model developed in the previous section to calculate W , the
lower limit of the teacher’s college graduates willingness to pay for the consumption
value of teacher’s college in the 1960’s. A unique Norwegian panel data set provides
very complex information on all these individuals. Unfortunately, there is no infor-
mation on actual working experience for the individuals in question, and thus the
potential experience approach of Mincer is applied. Define potential experience, Xp,
for each year as the age of the individual minus the age at school enrollment minus
the duration of the education minus a year for mandatory military service. Both
the expected price of the consumption value of teacher’s college at the time of the
educational choice and the actual price these individuals finally paid are calculated.
4.3 Measuring the ex-ante price of the consumption value
of teacher’s college.
The 1970 household census holds information on among other things educational
type, gross earnings, and age for all Norwegian adults. Utilizing this information,
the earnings by experience profiles for individuals with teacher’s college and busi-
ness school are estimated. These cross-section wage profiles are interpreted as the
teacher’s college and business school attendants’ expected future earnings profiles
in the late 1960’s.
The estimation approach diﬀers from that of Mincer, since the duration of the
education is fixed. The specification below is estimated separately for each group
during the 1960’s. It was expanded to a four year duration in 1975.
19See the appendix for more details.
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Figure 3: 1970 gross wage profiles for males with teacher’s college and business
school, by years of potential experience.
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using ordinary least squares:
lnW = α1 + α2Xp + α3X2p + ². (7)
From the estimation results (reported in figures 7 and 8 in the appendix) we
conclude that even though there are some diﬀerences in the return to experience in
favor of business school graduates, the major diﬀerence is between the constant α1
in the two groups. Teacher’s college graduates actually start their career with gross
earnings 34.7 % below that of business school graduates20.
Smoothed versions of the wage profiles for 29 years of work experience from the
1970 census are shown in figure 3. The teacher’s college graduates pay a substan-
tial wage premium in order to enjoy the consumption value of their educational
type, and this wage premium increases over their career. The earnings vary more
among business school graduates than among teacher’s college graduates. This may
to some extent be due to the fact that most teachers work in the public sector where
the wage level is set by centralized negotiations. The government is the employer
and exercises monopsony power, since the private labor market for teachers is very
20The estimation results are here transformed to NOK before finding the wage gap between the
two groups.
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Figure 4: Present values of 29 years worth of labor experience in thousand 1970-
NOK, calculated from the average earnings of males at diﬀerent levels of working
experience in the 1970-cencus. These are the gross expected average lifetime
earnings of individuals choosing teacher’s college and business school in the 1960’s.
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limited. Business school graduates, on the other hand, mostly work in the private
sector, where wage negotiations are local and the wage structure is more flexible.
The earnings of the business school graduates constitute the potential total in-
come for the teacher’s college graduates. Hence their minimum willingness to pay for
the consumption value of teacher’s college is the market compensating wage diﬀer-
ential. The start up wage diﬀerential is 34.7 %21 of the teacher’s college graduates’
potential lifetime income. But as the wage diﬀerential increases over the career, one
would expect the present value of the life time wage diﬀerential to be higher. The
exact size of this wage premium is not available directly from this estimation.
By applying the average wage at all levels of experience, the present value of the
lifetime income22 can be calculated for both business school graduates and teacher’s
college graduates. The results are shown in the table in figure 4, calculated at diﬀer-
ent discount rates. Independent of the discount rate, the wage gap between the two
groups is substantial. Teacher’s college graduates pay a price for the consumption
value of their education in the size of 38 % of the present value of their potential
21This is in line with Aarrestad’s (1969) results from his small sample survey in 1967.
22Assume here that the duration of the working period of the individual is 29 years. The reason
why this exact period is chosen, is that there are few observations in the sample with longer
potential working experience. This is to a great extent due to the early classes of business school
being small.
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gross lifetime income.
These are gross wages and, as previously discussed, the presence of a progressive
income would tax most likely reduce the wage gap and thus the price on teacher’s
college as a consumption good. The existence of a substantial willingness to pay for
the consumption value of teacher’s college is still nondismissable.
Some objections. Only annual earnings are available in the data. Hence part of
the wage gap might be due to diﬀerences in hours worked instead of wage diﬀerences.
There are no tuition fees at Norwegian universities, but the students still have
to finance their living expenses. The existence of publicly provided and subsidized
student loans eliminates, or at least reduces, the liquidity constraints that might oth-
erwise be present. For most of the 1960’s teacher’s college had a two-year duration,
while business school had a three-year duration. Thus, the major cost of acquir-
ing higher education, namely forgone labor income, is higher for business school
graduates. Therefore part of the wage gap between the two educational types is
compensation for the higher investment costs of business school.
The diﬀerent duration of the two educational types also matters if the individual
has a high discount rate. He then wants to start earning money as soon as possible,
which might induce him to choose teacher’s college rather than business school.
Geographical diﬀerences might matter. During the 1960’s there were teacher’s
colleges all over the country, and the individual who disliked moving had a good
chance of finding a teacher’s college close to home. Business school, on the other
hand, for a long time only existed in Bergen (The Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Administration), but later another school was founded in Oslo (The
Norwegian School of Management). This could also induce the individual to choose
teacher’s college over business school.
4.4 Measuring the ex-post price of the consumption value
of teacher’s college.
The previous section estimated the ex-ante willingness to pay for the consumption
value of teacher’s college among the individuals acquiring their education in the
1960’s. Did these individuals end up paying a higher or lower price than expected
for this consumption value?
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We now estimate the actual wage profiles of all individuals attending and grad-
uating from business school and teacher’s college during the 1960’s. By combining
the earnings register and the core administrative register we have information on
each individual’s income from 1967 to 2000, along with rich information including
factors such as educational type, graduation date, and birth date. Each individual
now has several entries in the created cross section set of annual earnings per year
of potential experience. Apply the same empirical specification as in equation (7),
but following Klette and Møen (2002), this time use a random eﬀect regression
to estimate the return to potential experience separately for the two educational
groups. The estimation results are reported in figures 9 and 10 in the appendix, and
smoothed wage profiles for the two groups are drawn in figure 5.
It is clear that the ex-post wage profiles diﬀer quite a lot from the ex-ante wage
profiles. It is rather surprising, though, that the wage gap at the beginning of the
career is smaller than predicted. The teacher’s college graduates started their careers
with annual gross earnings 20.6 % below that of the business school graduates, where
the corresponding ex-ante wage gap was 34.7 %. But business school graduates
experience rapid wage increases over their careers, relative to the teacher’s college
graduates, as is clearly seen in figure 5. This would have a large impact on the
present value of the two groups’ lifetime income.
Since the wage diﬀerential increases heavily over the years, the present values of
the two groups’ actual lifetime income depends on which discount rate is chosen,
as shown in the table in figure 6. The more weight the individual puts on future
earnings, the lower his discount rate, and the higher the price of the consumption
value of teacher’s college measured in forgone potential income. The ex-post price on
the consumption value of teacher’s college is between 45 % and 48 % of the individ-
uals’ potential lifetime income, depending on the discount rate. This is substantially
higher than the ex-ante price of 38 % of their potential lifetime income. Some of the
reason for these high wage diﬀerentials might be that observations from the 1980’s
are included in the sample, a period where the private sector enjoyed a high wage
increases relative to the public sector.
The ex-ante wage profiles were estimated on cross-section data from 1970, while
the ex-post wage profiles were estimated as cross-section variation between indi-
viduals observed over 29 years. During this time period, the tax system changed
several times, both changing the tax base as well as the marginal tax rates. The
23
Figure 5: The actual deflated gross wage profiles of individuals attending teacher’s
college and business school in the 1960’s, by years of potential experience after grad-
uation.
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higher the marginal tax rates in the higher income brackets, the more one would
expect the net of taxes wage gap between the two groups to be reduced. Still, even
though the marginal tax rates have been reduced over the years, the tax base has
been broadened, such that it is not possible to say whether these reduced marginal
tax rates increased the net of tax wage diﬀerentials or not. A thorough analysis is
required to answer this, and that is left for future research. The main objective of
this paper is to establish as a fact that individuals have high willingness to pay for
the consumption value of education, rather than to find the exact size of this net of
taxes willingness to pay.
Further objections. The estimated wage gaps do not account for the fact that
teachers are provided with a public sector retirement insurance, while these retire-
ment insurances vary in both extent and quality in the private sector. If pension
benefits had been included in the earnings profiles, it might be that the wage gap
between the two groups had been smaller.
We have to some extent controlled for heterogeneity in ability among individuals
by comparing two types of educations with the same cut-oﬀ grade level requirements
from high school. But it is not certain that the upward ability distribution is the same
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Figure 6: Present values of 29 years worth of labor experience in thousand 1970-
NOK, calculated at diﬀerent discount rates. These are the actual average gross
lifetime earnings of individuals choosing teacher’s college and business school in
the 1960’s. Data from the earnings and pension registers, only males.
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in the two groups, such that some heterogeneity might still exist. Teachers mostly
get the same wage independent of performance, while wages are more individual
specific in the private sector. Hence the wage incentives to choose business school
are higher the more skilled the individual.
Also, the approach in this paper corrects for the level of the innate abilities,
but not the diﬀerence in types of ability. Willis and Rosen (1979) found that a
person chooses the kind and length of education that maximize his income. They
only consider monetary income, but the results may also be interpreted to include
non-monetary income. This means that a good lawyer would not necessarily have
made a good plumber, and that the individuals maximize their income and utility
according to their abilities and preferences23 Both teacher’s college and business
school are still pretty much all-round types of educations, with a broad range of
diﬀerent subjects. Also, admissions are made based on the average grade level from
high school, meaning that the students need good all-round skills.
23This is in contrast to the one-factor-ability-as-IQ literature that says that the best lawyers
would also have made the best plumbers.
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5 Conclusion.
This paper argues for the existence of an individual specific consumption value of
education, both during the education and after its completion, and for which the
individual is willing to pay. A method for measuring the willingness to pay for the
consumption value of education where the innate ability bias is corrected for is
suggested in a compensating diﬀerentials framework.
On rich Norwegian cross section data it is estimated that the individuals who
attended teacher’s college in Norway during the 1960’s expected to start their first
job with annual earnings 34.7 % below their potential earnings. The full ex-ante
price for the consumption value of teacher’s college is estimated to be 38 % of the
present value of the individual’s potential lifetime income.
Utilizing a full coverage panel data set on the Norwegian population it is esti-
mated that the teacher’s college graduates in fact started up their first job earning
”only” 20.6 % less than the business school graduates. However these wage diﬀeren-
tials increased over time. The ex-post price on the consumption value to teacher’s
college during the 1960’s turned out to be about 46 % of the present value of the
individuals’ potential lifetime income.
The goal of the paper has not been to find an exact value of the willingness to
pay for the consumption value of education, but rather to establish as a fact that the
consumption value of education does exist and that it is an important factor behind
the individual’s educational choice. As the example shows, many individuals are
willing to give up substantial future wage returns in order to acquire the education
of their choice. Therefore, the consumption value of education should not be ignored
when modeling the individual’s educational choice and estimating the return to
education.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Documentation of admission requirements.
It is a general perception that during the 1960’s it was just as diﬃcult to be admitted
to teacher’s college as to business school in Norway. Aarrestad (1969) stated24 on
24The following quotations are translated from Norwegian.
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page 69: ”The demand for teacher’s college education far exceeds the supply. The mini-
mum requirement for admission has the last years been above 60 grade points (from high
school).” Also, on page 75 he states: ”The admission requirements for the Norwegian
School of Economics and Business Administration are not quite clear. With maximum
awarded additional points, it is today possible to be admitted with about 60 grade points
from high school.”
It proved diﬃcult to find formal evidence for these admittance requirements. In
the archives of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration25
and of the Teacher’s Council26 I found indications that the last student admitted
to teacher’s college and to business school had about the same grade levels, but no
oﬃcial statistics are available on this issue. Another problem with comparing the
two is that the diﬀerent institutions had diﬀerent regulations for giving so-called
additional points to the applicants, such that their total competitive grade score
varied from their high school graduation grade score. Additional points were awarded
for previous education and work experience, and for extracurricular activities, but
the praxis varied among the institutions.
7.2 Data
The 1970 Household Census covers all Norwegian households and individuals
(identified by their personal identification number). The census contains information
on among other things on gross income, sex, age, marital status, type and level of
education, and personal income.
The Earnings Register covers all Norwegian adults and contains gross indi-
vidual earnings based on pension rights earned over the period 1967-2000.
The Core Administrative Register contains information on all Norwegians in
the years 1986-2000. It has among many other variables age, sex, marital status, type
and length of highest completed education, graduation date. The income history of
the individuals can be extended by including the earnings history of the individuals
25For a long time this was the only business school in Norway, but at the and of the 1960’s
another one was founded as well.
26From about 1967 admission to all teacher’s colleges in Norway was organized centrally by the
Teacher’s Council (Lærerutdanningsrådet). Before that time the admission was organized by each
school, and the requirements varied from school to school.
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from the earnings register.
The cleaned sample for calculation of the ex-ante wage profiles. Individ-
uals with missing observations on either educational type or income are removed
from the sample. Beyond that all individuals who graduated from teacher’s college
or business school in the period 1941-1970 are included in the sample, in order to
estimate the full income profile for 0-29 years of working experience in 1970 for the
two groups. Even individuals who for some reason were not active in the labor force
are included. When a young person makes his educational choice, the future wage
return is uncertain for many reasons, and one of them is that he might become ill
and be unable to work. If one type of education leads to more stressful jobs than
the other, more individuals will become ill, and the wage level while still at work
needs to be higher in order to compensate for this. Hence the income of those not
currently in the labor force in 1970, but with potential labor experience between 0
and 29 years, needs to be included to get the full picture.
The full sample of males in the 1970 census counts 2269 business school graduates
and 7089 teacher’s college graduates.
The cleaned sample for calculation of the ex-post wage profiles. The first
challenge was to identify who acquired the two educational types during the 1960’s,
as well as to find their potential working experience. In principle, I could use the
graduation date in the core administrative register to establish when the individual
most likely started working, and thus find the potential working experience in years.
Unfortunately, all who completed their education prior to November 1970 are listed
with this as their graduation date. Therefore I use their date of birth, add 19 years
(to complete high-school) to find the time when they most likely started their higher
education, and add another 2 or 3 years to find graduation date. Finally I added
another year for the mandatory military service (some did this before and others
after their education, but most did it before they started working) to find when they
most likely started their professional careers.
This procedure identified the individuals acquiring their education during the
1960’s, as well as their entry into the labor force. By merging the core administrative
data with the earnings register, I got the gross income series for these individuals
from 1967 to 2000. From this the earnings history of the individuals from 0 to 29
32
Figure 7: Results, ordinary least squares regression, teachers, 1970-census.
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    7089 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,  7086) = 1380.21 
       Model |  678.480338     2  339.240169           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1741.66185  7086  .245789141           R-squared     =  0.2803 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2801 
       Total |  2420.14219  7088  .341442183           Root MSE      =  .49577 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         lnW |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        pexp |   .0958324   .0026617    36.00   0.000     .0906146    .1010501 
      sqpexp |  -.0024115   .0001008   -23.93   0.000     -.002609    -.002214 
       _cons |   9.796686   .0126202   776.27   0.000     9.771947    9.821426 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Figure 8: Results, ordinary least squares regression, business school graduates, 1970-
census.
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2269 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,  2266) =  540.54 
       Model |  263.700785     2  131.850392           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  552.728836  2266  .243922699           R-squared     =  0.3230 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3224 
       Total |  816.429621  2268  .359977787           Root MSE      =  .49389 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         lnW |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        pexp |   .0999329   .0043521    22.96   0.000     .0913984    .1084674 
      sqpexp |  -.0025426   .0001625   -15.64   0.000    -.0028613   -.0022238 
       _cons |   10.22356   .0222558   459.37   0.000     10.17992    10.26721 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
years of potential experience was extracted.
When the panel was cleaned for entries missing information on annual earnings,
the final sample consisted of 465 business school graduates with a total of 13110
observation entries, and 1805 teacher’s college graduates with a total of 50153 ob-
servation entries.
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Figure 9: Results, random eﬀects regression, teachers, earnings register.
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     50153 
Group variable (i) : pid                        Number of groups   =      1805 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2680                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0206                                        avg =      27.8 
       overall = 0.2021                                        max =        33 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(2)       =  17749.49 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         lnW |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        pexp |   .0783991   .0007973    98.34   0.000     .0768365    .0799617 
      sqpexp |  -.0018876   .0000258   -73.24   0.000    -.0019382   -.0018371 
       _cons |    9.94585    .007921  1255.63   0.000     9.930326    9.961375 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .25123219 
     sigma_e |    .357633 
         rho |  .33042589   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Figure 10: Results, random eﬀects regression, business school graduates, earnings
register.
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =     13110 
Group variable (i) : pid                        Number of groups   =       465 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3778                         Obs per group: min =        13 
       between = 0.0593                                        avg =      28.2 
       overall = 0.3069                                        max =        30 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(2)       =   7694.71 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         lnW |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        pexp |   .1192716   .0020061    59.45   0.000     .1153397    .1232035 
      sqpexp |  -.0027991   .0000687   -40.75   0.000    -.0029337   -.0026645 
       _cons |   10.17645   .0185267   549.28   0.000     10.14014    10.21276 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .29900569 
     sigma_e |   .4930236 
         rho |  .26890429   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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